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16 GREEN BAG 2D 135 
IN DEFENSE OF 
SCHOLARS’ BRIEFS 
A RESPONSE TO RICHARD FALLON 
Amanda Frost† 
N A THOUGHTFUL AND PROVOCATIVE ESSAY, Richard Fallon crit-
icizes law professors for lightly signing on to so-called “schol-
ars’ briefs,” that is, amicus briefs filed on behalf of a group of 
law professors claiming expertise in the subject area.1 Fallon 
argues that law professors are constrained by ethical obligations 
from joining such a brief without first satisfying standards similar to 
those governing the production of scholarship, and he believes that 
law professors should sign onto fewer briefs than they currently do. 
His essay has received considerable attention in the press and from 
law professors, most of it positive.2 I applaud Fallon for raising the 
† Amanda Frost is a Professor of Law at the American University Washington College of Law. 
Copyright © 2103 Amanda Frost. 
1 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 223 (2012). 
2 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Friend-of-Court Filings Mushroom, and a Law Professor Takes Issue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, at A23; Michael C. Dorf, Scholars’ Amicus Brief Controver-
sy Reflects the Evolving Relationship Between the Bench and the Legal Academy, available at 
verdict.justia.com/2011/11/21/scholars%e2%80%99-amicus-brief-controversy-ref 
lects-the-evolving-relationship-between-the-bench-and-the-legal-academy (“I have no 
gripe with the substance of what [Fallon] wrote . . . . As I told Liptak for the Times 
story, I admire Fallon’s high standards.”); Paul Horwitz, Fallon, Amicus Briefs, and the 
Health Care Litigation, available at prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/11/ 
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issue, but I disagree with significant aspects of his argument. 
This response begins with a brief overview of Fallon’s arguments 
in favor of constraining law professors from participating in scholars’ 
briefs. Part II describes my own views regarding the ethical standards 
that apply to scholars’ briefs and then discusses the benefits to the 
bench and the academy of scholars’ briefs that meet these standards. 
I conclude by explaining why I do not believe that scholars’ briefs 
need to satisfy the standards that apply to legal scholarship.  
I. 
THE CASE AGAINST SCHOLARS’ BRIEFS 
allon’s essay is timely. As he points out, scholars’ briefs have 
proliferated in recent years, with such briefs filed in more than a 
third of the Supreme Court’s cases in the 2010 Term.3 Not much 
has been written about the potential conflicts between the law pro-
fessor’s role as scholar on the one hand, and as advocate for specific 
political or legal outcomes on the other.4 The practice deserves 
closer scrutiny, and Fallon’s essay provides a well-laid foundation on 
which to start the debate. 
Fallon’s essay is thorough and thoughtful, and I cannot do its 37 
pages justice in this brief overview. I therefore urge readers to read 
his essay first, rather than relying on my summary of his position. 
Nonetheless, I hope this Part contains a fair rendition of Fallon’s 
critique of the current state of affairs with regard to scholars’ briefs 
to set the stage for the counter-arguments that follow. 
Fallon’s objection to scholars’ briefs is a serious one. He argues 
that law professors who sign such briefs “attempt to leverage their 
credibility as teachers and scholars to influence non-scholarly audi-
ences, sometimes for personal gain and sometimes without satisfying 
the standards on which their scholarly reputations depend.”5 Recent 
fallon-amicus-briefs-and-the-healthcare-litigation.html (“Most law professors, I 
would guess, are inclined to agree with Fallon’s recommendations in principle.”). 
3 See Fallon, supra note 1, at 224. 
4 See id. at 227-28 (noting the dearth of literature on this subject). 
5 Id. at 228. 
F 
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surveys of judges, justices, and law clerks suggest that scholars’ briefs 
are given closer attention than other amicus curiae briefs because 
they are viewed as “‘offer[ing] an informed legal analysis of a pressing 
legal question from a relatively neutral perspective.’”6 In short, such 
briefs carry an “implied warranty of scholarly integrity” that these 
decisionmakers rely upon when deciding hard cases, and yet they 
often fail to satisfy the standards that govern legal scholarship.7 
Fallon provides several examples of scholars’ briefs that he felt 
morally obligated not to join. For instance, Fallon refused to sign a 
brief authored by Professor Michael Dorf about an issue in Fallon’s 
field of expertise because he was unfamiliar with a significant num-
ber of the cases cited in it.8 Fallon also declined to sign a brief by 
Professor Barry Friedman that made reasonable arguments about the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, but left out competing 
arguments that cut in the other direction.9 Fallon explained that he 
would also object to signing a brief that relied on a precedent he 
thought wrongly decided, or that used a theory of interpretation 
that he rejects, at least without inserting a caveat explaining his ac-
tual views on those questions.10 As Fallon well knows, many law 
professors sign scholars’ briefs in such circumstances without any 
hesitation. This is the practice to which he objects.  
Fallon is particularly concerned that, in the absence of scholarly 
rigor, law professors may allow themselves to be swayed by their 
ideological preferences into signing onto briefs that mischaracterize 
6 Id. at 225 (quoting Linda Sandstrom Simar, An Empirical Analysis of Amici Curiae in 
Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 Rev. Litig. 
669, 698-99 (2008)). 
7 Id. at 228. 
8 See id. at 231 (“The sole ground for my hesitation in pronouncing the brief to be 
simply exemplary in all respects is that it relied on so many cases. Of the dozens 
of Supreme Court decisions to which the brief referred, there were some that I 
know well, but others that I recall only hazily at best. The brief also cited at least 
nine Supreme Court cases that I cannot remember ever having read at all, and 12 
lower court decisions that I know I have never read.”). 
9 See id. at 231-33. 
10 See id. at 259. 
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the law. He writes that the “best or correct resolution of a legal is-
sue depends partly on how the result would cohere or fail to cohere 
with a sometimes intricate network of existing authorities.”11 Al-
though Fallon acknowledges that ideology inevitably influences legal 
analysis, he is concerned that law professors often fail to give the 
proper weight to legal precedent and other authority when signing 
scholars’ briefs.12  
To avoid this possibility, Fallon argues that when a law professor 
signs onto briefs in her role as scholar, rather than as an advocate for 
one of the parties, she should consider herself bound to the same 
norms that govern the production of scholarship. Fallon breaks these 
norms down into three categories. First, a professor should assume 
individual responsibility for a scholars’ brief in much the same way she 
assumes responsibility for the content of papers published under her 
name, meaning that she should engage in independent research to en-
sure that the claims in the brief are supported by the authorities cited. 
Second, a professor should only join a scholars’ brief if she sincerely 
believes all of its claims and arguments, which he labels the scholarly 
norm of trustworthiness. Finally, a professor should ensure that any 
scholars’ brief she joins satisfies the norm of confrontation, meaning 
that it candidly addresses significant objections to its analysis.13 
Fallon concedes that these norms need some tweaking to take in-
to account the constraints on legal briefs. For example, he acknowl-
edges that due to page limitations, a scholars’ brief cannot raise and 
address every objection to the thrust of its argument, necessitating 
modification of the scholarly norm of confrontation.14 Nonetheless, 
he argues that scholars signing onto briefs should adhere to the 
norms of individual responsibility, trustworthiness, and confronta-
tion as closely as possible within the limits of the form.  
Fallon is well aware that doing so would reduce the number of 
scholars’ briefs as well as the number of signatories on such briefs, 
                                                                                                 
11 Id. at 229. 
12 Id. at 229-30, 256. 
13 See id. at 242. 
14 Id. at 255. 
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and might alter the content of those that are filed. Indeed, this is one 
of Fallon’s goals in authoring his essay. He thinks law professors 
should “say no” to joining such briefs “much more frequently than 
many of us now do,” and that those briefs that professors do agree to 
join should “reflect higher norms of scholarly integrity than many 
such briefs now satisfy.”15 
II. 
THE BENEFITS OF SCHOLARS’ BRIEFS 
his Part describes my view of the ethical obligations that con-
strain scholars’ briefs – obligations that exceed those that apply 
to the lawyer filing a brief for a client, but which do not require the 
brief to meet the norms of scholarship. This Part then explains why 
such briefs can benefit both the bench and the academy. 
A. The Ethical Standards for Filing Scholars’ Briefs 
cholars’ briefs can serve a valuable role, both by helping judges 
decide hard cases and by creating a connection between the 
academy and the practice of law. To serve those dual purposes, the 
signatory to a scholars’ brief must satisfy higher standards than those 
that apply to a practicing lawyer authoring or signing a brief on be-
half of a client. Specifically, a scholar should only sign a brief if she: 
1) is an expert in the area of law addressed in the brief; 2) has no 
financial interest or personal stake in the case; and 3) concludes that 
the arguments made in the brief are reasonable and support an out-
come that the professor sincerely believes to be the best possible in 
light of real world constraints – by which I mean the limited space 
and time to make such arguments, as well as constraints posed by 
existing positive law and legal precedent.16 
In contrast, practicing lawyers may ethically sign briefs in areas 
of law in which they can claim no special expertise, and on behalf of 
                                                                                                 
15 Id. at 227. 
16 The third requirement flows naturally from the first two, because a disinterested 
expert will only sign a brief if she thinks it is reasonable and agrees with the re-
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clients that pay them to do so. Although the brief cannot be frivo-
lous or malicious, the practicing lawyer has no ethical obligation to 
agree with the argument that he is making. Thus, these three re-
quirements of expertise, disinterestedness, and sincerity are signifi-
cant additional ethical constraints on academics who author and sign 
scholars’ briefs.  
However, I do not believe that academics are ethically con-
strained to sign only those scholars’ briefs that satisfy scholarly 
norms as defined by Fallon. That is, I contend that a law professor 
has acted ethically by signing onto a brief under the criteria de-
scribed above, even if she did not engage in independent research, 
and even if the brief does not acknowledge all significant competing 
objections to its arguments. Nor do I think she must believe that all 
claims and arguments in the brief are “the best or correct resolution 
of [the] legal issue,” in large part because an effective brief must 
work within the constraints of positive law and precedent that also 
constrain the court with which the brief is filed. 
B. The Benefits of Scholars’ Briefs 
efore discussing my bases for disagreeing with Fallon in more 
detail, it is worth examining whether scholars’ briefs have any 
value if they do not meet the standards for legal scholarship. As Fal-
lon points out, scholars join such briefs not as interested citizens but 
as legal academics, thereby claiming a special status from which to 
advise judges on the meaning of law.17 Is there any basis for making 
this claim if the briefs themselves are not imbued with the attributes 
of legal scholarship? 
I see several reasons for valuing such briefs. First, applying my 
criteria, law professors should only author or sign briefs if they are 
experts in the subject. Unlike the average appellate lawyer, who is a 
generalist and thus might write an amicus brief in an area which she 
knew nothing about before taking on the assignment, law professors 
devote their lives to teaching and writing in specific areas of the law, 
and oftentimes have practiced in that area as well. It is fair to say 
                                                                                                 
17 See Fallon, supra note 1, at 228. 
B 
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that the average law professor has a deeper understanding of the law 
governing an issue in an amicus brief than does the average lawyer 
writing such an amicus brief on behalf of a paying client. In at least 
some cases, courts will benefit from this expertise.18 
Second, scholars are uniquely disinterested, in that they have no 
financial or personal stake in most litigation. They are not submit-
ting the brief on behalf of a paying client, or to promote the agenda 
of a particular organization, or to satisfy a professional obligation. 
The job of law professor does not require writing or signing onto 
such briefs, and many never do so.19 Thus, law professors have no 
reason to author or join such briefs unless they sincerely support the 
result advocated for in the brief, and think a reasonable argument 
can be made for that result. These factors set scholars’ briefs apart 
from most amicus briefs, and make them at least a shade more cred-
ible. For example, a lawyer working for an anti-death-penalty group 
might author an amicus brief opposing the death penalty in every 
single case before the Supreme Court on that subject. In contrast, a 
law professor who believes that the death penalty is unconstitutional 
might choose to participate in only those cases in which the legal 
arguments against capital punishment are particularly strong. 
At least a few scholars’ briefs have provided significant assistance 
to the Supreme Court in resolving difficult cases for just these rea-
sons. Perhaps the best example is the amicus brief filed in Romer v. 
                                                                                                 
18 I am not claiming that most scholars’ briefs have a significant influence on the 
outcome of the cases in which they are submitted. However, here is some evi-
dence that amicus briefs generally benefit the parties they support. See Joseph D. 
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Briefs on the Supreme Court, 
148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 830 (2000). In addition, the surveys and studies cited by 
Fallon suggest that scholars’ briefs carry at least a little added weight with some 
law clerks and judges. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 225-26. 
19 Nor is there any reason to think that signing onto an amicus brief enhances a 
professor’s status in the academy. Scholars’ briefs are rarely read or discussed by 
legal academics as they would legal scholarship, and are rarely included as materi-
al to be reviewed for tenure or promotion. Although professors will often note 
that they have authored such briefs on their curriculum vitae, I have not seen a 
professor list her decision to join in such a brief on any publicly available docu-
ment describing her accomplishments. 
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Evans by constitutional law Professors Laurence Tribe, John Ely, 
Gerald Gunther, Philip Kurland, and Kathleen Sullivan.20 That brief 
provided a different rationale for striking down a Colorado statute 
than was offered by the parties – a rationale that persuaded a majori-
ty of the Court.21 The signatories to that brief had well-deserved 
reputations as pre-eminent authorities on constitutional law. They 
had no personal or financial stake in the case and were submitting 
the brief on their own behalf, and not that of a client. Thus, the Jus-
tices could rely on their brief as presenting sincere and reasonable 
arguments. If the brief were written by a concerned citizen, a gay-
rights group, or a lawyer on behalf of a paying client, it would likely 
have carried less weight. 
In addition to serving the interests of judges, scholars’ briefs 
benefit the academy. Law professors are often derided for produc-
ing highly theoretical scholarship that has no connection to the prac-
tice of law. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts recently stated: “What the 
academy is doing, as far as I can tell, is largely of no use or interest 
to people who actually practice law.”22 Likewise, law schools are 
frequently criticized for failing to adequately train their students to 
be practicing lawyers.23 When a scholar writes or signs onto an ami-
cus brief, he must bring his scholarship down to earth, translating 
his perhaps quite theoretical views of how the law should be inter-
preted into concrete arguments that might actually succeed in per-
suading a court.  
The authors as well as the signatories of scholars’ briefs benefit 
from this exercise. Connecting theory and practice in this way 
should inform a law professor’s scholarship and teaching, reminding 
the law professor that he is part of a professional school that must ul-
                                                                                                 
20 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
21 See Jeffrey Toobin, Supreme Sacrifice, New Yorker, July 8, 1996 (discussing Tribe’s 
influential amicus brief). 
22 Adam Liptak, Keep the Briefs Brief, Literary Justices Advise, N.Y. Times, A12 (May 
20, 2011). See also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Educa-
tion and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992). 
23 See, e.g., David Segal, What they Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. Times, 
A11, Nov. 19, 2011. 
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timately justify itself by serving the profession. Indeed, it is partly 
for this reason that I reject Fallon’s view that a scholars’ brief must 
maintain some of the purity of scholarship. I see value in that purity, 
but I also see value in recognizing the need to abandon purity for 
expediency when authoring an amicus brief that hopes to persuade a 
judge deciding a concrete case. 
III. 
DISTINGUISHING SCHOLARS’ BRIEFS  
FROM SCHOLARSHIP 
s explained in Part II, I believe that signatories to a scholars’ 
brief must be disinterested experts who carefully read the brief 
and are satisfied that it contains reasonable arguments and advocates 
for a result that they support. Beyond this, however, Fallon and I 
part ways, for I do not believe that scholars’ briefs must satisfy 
standards similar to those that govern scholarship. 
A concrete example illustrates the difference in our perspectives. 
Fallon argues that the norm of trustworthiness requires that a pro-
fessor make explicit when any argument in a brief is at odds with 
that professor’s purest beliefs about the law. So, for example, a law 
professor who believes that the death penalty is unconstitutional 
should not sign a brief that cites and relies upon precedent uphold-
ing capital punishment, even if the purpose of citing that precedent 
is to explain how the case before the court is distinguishable, unless 
the professor makes his views about the constitutional status of the 
death penalty clear.24 Similarly, Fallon asserts that a professor who is 
an originalist should not sign a brief that turns on non-originalist 
assumptions unless the brief explains that the professor views such 
assumptions as incorrect, but nonetheless is making arguments 
based on them in the hope of convincing the court to adopt what he 
believes to be the correct result in the case.25 I disagree that such 
candor is called for in a scholars’ brief.  
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Furthermore, I contend that law professors may ethically sign a 
brief without reading, or re-reading, every authority cited in it, as 
long as they are experts in the area of law, have carefully read the 
brief, and trust the brief’s author. Finally, law professors may ethi-
cally sign briefs that make reasonable arguments, even if those ar-
guments are not the “best” arguments from a scholarly perspective, 
and even if some counter-arguments are omitted.26 In short, I think 
Fallon would not have violated the moral and ethical norms of his 
profession had he signed onto both Michael Dorf’s and Barry Fried-
man’s amicus briefs.27 
My disagreement with Fallon can be traced back to our different 
perspectives on two issues, one philosophical and one practical. As a 
philosophical matter, I have a different understanding of the rela-
tionship between law and politics. As a practical matter, I place 
greater significance on the differences in form and context between 
an amicus brief and legal scholarship.  
A. Law and Politics 
lthough Fallon and I agree that judicial decisions should turn on 
some combination of ideological perspective and existing legal 
authority, we differ on the relative importance of the two. In my 
view, the “best” or “correct” legal result sometimes cannot be sepa-
rated entirely, or even significantly, from political or ideological 
preferences, particularly in close cases. Existing precedent and other 
authorities usually cannot provide a clear answer to the most inter-
esting and meaningful legal questions, and thus politics inevitably 
influence the interpretation of those authorities and the ultimate 
                                                                                                 
26 As I discuss in more detail below, see infra notes 28 to 36 and accompanying text, 
I find it difficult to separate out my understanding of the “best” argument from the 
context in which the argument is being made. In other words, the “best” argu-
ment before a court is not necessarily the “best” argument from a pure scholarly 
perspective.  
27 Of course no professor should sign a brief if he is uncomfortable with its content 
for any reason. Fallon has every right not to join either Dorf’s or Friedman’s 
brief, and I do not think he should feel any pressure to do so. I simply disagree 
that he was obligated by the ethics of his profession to refuse to sign those briefs. 
A 
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result. Indeed, this is the teaching of a long line of legal realists, who 
observed that legal authority such as precedent and canons of inter-
pretation, although certainly relevant to any analysis, are nonethe-
less indeterminate and often manipulated in the service of political 
goals.28  
Moreover, I believe that ideology should play a significant role in 
resolving close legal questions, albeit one that is limited by existing 
legal authority and the institutional roles of the decisionmakers in-
volved.29 Statutes, regulations, and constitutional provisions are 
drafted by human beings and are intended to have real world conse-
quences. Any approach to interpreting and applying these laws re-
quires an understanding of these consequences, along with a view 
about the role of law and the role of the legal institutions responsi-
ble for administering the law.30 I see no way of extracting ideology 
from this endeavor, nor do I see any reason to do so. In short, there 
is no great divide between an ideologically preferred result and the 
“correct” legal result because ideological preferences can, and 
should, affect interpretation.  
                                                                                                 
28 See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950) (de-
scribing how for each “canon” of interpretation there is a conflicting canon, which 
allows judges to pick and choose canons to support their preferred results); Mark 
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 Yale L.J. 1515, 1518 (1991) 
(describing the conclusion of many critical legal studies scholars that law is “inde-
terminate” and “political”). 
29 See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 156-159 (2d. ed. 1951) 
(asserting that a judge’s “decency and sense” are relevant to resolving legal prob-
lems). 
30 See, e.g., HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROB-
LEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Phillip K. Frickey eds., 1994). Hart and Sacks argued that a court “should 
try to put itself in imagination in the position of the legislature which enacted the 
measure,” but “should not do this in the mood of a cynical observer,” but rather 
should “assume” that the “legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing 
reasonable purposes reasonably.” Id. at 1378. They also believed that the “whole 
context” of a statute should be examined to aid in interpretation, and that a court 
“may draw on general public knowledge of what was considered to be the mis-
chief that needed remedying.” Id. at 1379. 
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Political scientists have shown that judges themselves are swayed 
at least as much by their ideological preferences as by legal prece-
dent, although the two undoubtedly influence each other.31 The Su-
preme Court can, and often does, overrule its own precedent,32 find 
constitutional rights that are nowhere laid out in that document’s 
text,33 and adopt new interpretations of long-existing statutes.34 In a 
world in which this is a fairly common occurrence, it seems odd to 
tell law professors that they should only sign the briefs that contain 
the “correct” result as measured primarily against “existing authori-
ties,” rather than real world consequences.35  
I want to be careful not to overstate this point. Obviously, there 
are cases in which one’s preferred outcome simply cannot be recon-
ciled with any existing authority. Politics alone should not be al-
lowed to dictate the answer to legal questions, either for law profes-
sors writing amicus briefs or for judges deciding cases.36 According-
ly, law professors should not author or sign an amicus brief that 
makes arguments based solely on their personal preferences, partly 
because such a brief would be a waste of everyone’s time, and partly 
because law professors should not make arguments they know have 
                                                                                                 
31 See, e.g., Jeffrey Segal & Harold Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of 
the United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 Amer. J. Pol. Sci. 971 (1996); Donald 
Songer & Stefanie Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The Impact of the Justices’ Values on 
Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 Amer. J. Pol. Sci. 1049 (1996); CASS R. SUN-
STEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY (2006).  
32 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912 (2010) (overruling Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)). 
33 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring that women have a consti-
tutional right to obtain abortions). 
34 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (declaring that Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that the claims in a complaint satisfy a “plausi-
bility” standard).  
35 Fallon, supra note 1, at 229. 
36 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 29, at 156-159 (explaining that although courts have 
“leeway” to decide hard cases due to the indeterminacy of precedent and doctrine, 
“courts do not and cannot simply use the leeways of doctrine as they please,” but 
rather are “controlled by the traditions of their office”). 
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no basis in any external authority.  
Nor do I want to mischaracterize Fallon’s view. Fallon also be-
lieves that ideology has some influence on interpretation, and would 
not claim that a case could be decided on legal precedent alone.37 In 
other words, we differ in degree, but not in kind. Nonetheless, the 
difference is important, because it explains why I think law profes-
sors are justified in signing onto amicus briefs that contain reasona-
ble arguments that promote normatively preferable results, even if 
there are competing arguments that are a better fit with existing 
precedent and other authorities. Indeed, the goal of such a brief 
might be to weaken or even abolish those authorities in the interest 
of moving the law in a new direction – an objective that I think is an 
ethically defensible goal for any law professor seeking to influence a 
court. 
B. The Role of the Amicus Brief 
s a practical matter, I believe that the differences in form and 
context between amicus briefs and legal scholarship necessitate 
applying significantly different standards to the two. Fallon 
acknowledges that amicus briefs come with limitations that do not 
accompany scholarly work, and he alters his three scholarly norms 
slightly to accommodate those differences.38 I view the differences 
between amicus briefs and scholarly articles as more important than 
he does, which in turn justifies greater deviations from scholarship 
norms. In particular, I believe that an amicus brief must operate 
within the constraints of the system in which judges (and not law 
professors) operate. For example, it must grapple with precedent 
which the law professor might prefer to reject wholesale, and it 
must assume that the adversarial system is generally an effective way 
to resolve disputes. Again, these differences between us, while not 
large, lead to different conclusions about the obligations of a law 
professor when signing onto an amicus brief. 
                                                                                                 
37 See Fallon, supra note 1, at 230-31, 241. 
38 Id. at 254-57. 
A 
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C. The Standards that Should Govern Scholars’ Briefs 
ogether, these differences lead me to conclude that law profes-
sors may ethically sign scholars’ briefs without adhering to the 
norms of individual responsibility, trustworthiness, and confronta-
tion that govern scholarship, or at least not to the degree that Fallon 
would require. I will begin with trustworthiness, because our dif-
ferent perspectives are most starkly visible there. 
1. Trustworthiness 
Unlike Fallon, I believe that a professor may permissibly sign a 
scholars’ brief that relies on precedents or other authorities with 
which the professor disagrees, as long as those arguments are rea-
sonable and support an outcome that the professor sincerely believes 
to be the best possible in light of existing constraints. To use Fallon’s 
example,39 even if a professor holds the view that the death penalty 
is unconstitutional and that the precedents saying otherwise are 
wrong, I believe the professor may author or sign an amicus brief 
that relies on those very precedents to argue against the execution of 
a particular defendant.  
This hypothetical raises the difficulty of identifying the “best” or 
“correct” legal analysis in any case. A professor might conclude that 
the death penalty is unconstitutional based on the text of the Eighth 
Amendment, but she cannot deny that capital punishment has been 
declared constitutionally permissible by the U.S. Supreme Court.40 
Indeed, even if a professor sincerely believes that the death penalty 
violates the Eighth Amendment, she could at the same time view a 
district court decision holding it to be unconstitutional as incorrect, 
even illegitimate, in light of these Supreme Court precedents.41 
                                                                                                 
39 Id. at 259.  
40 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that capital punishment 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). 
41 Cf. Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 155, 192 (describing the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision to issue multiple stays of execution in Vasquez v. Harris over 
Supreme Court objection, and concluding that it is “impudent” for a judge to 
“admit[] that his moral title to exercise authority over his fellow citizens derives 
T 
In Defense of Scholars’ Briefs 
WINTER 2013 149 
Thus, even if the professor is convinced that the correct legal result 
in the abstract would be to declare the death penalty unconstitution-
al, that professor might nonetheless conclude that the correct out-
come in a particular case is that this defendant does not qualify for 
the penalty under the existing (albeit flawed) precedent.  
Fallon suggests that a law professor in this conundrum sign such 
a brief only if he inserts a caveat explaining that he believes the 
precedent on which the brief relies is itself in error.42 But this seems 
unnecessary for any law professor who acknowledges that the best 
analysis of a legal question from a scholarly perspective may not be 
the correct approach for a judge constrained by precedent. When a 
law professor signs a scholars’ brief, she is putting aside (though cer-
tainly not disavowing) one set of views about the best outcome – 
views that she can only consider to be the “best” in a world in which 
she gets to rewrite precedent and ignore politics – in favor of argu-
ments about the best outcome in light of existing limitations, whether 
they be limitations created by precedent, political expediency, or 
the current composition of the Supreme Court. In other words, 
there are at least two “best” views of the law, and in the context of 
an amicus brief what matters is the view a judge could adopt in light 
of the constraints on her decisionmaking. 
Furthermore, as a practical matter, a brief that explicitly noted 
every precedent or doctrine that at least one signatory disavowed 
would lose its power to persuade. A justice or law clerk would like-
ly discount a brief’s careful attempt to explain how existing case law 
supports the result if that same brief further states that the signato-
ries think the whole line of cases in this area were wrongly decided. 
The primary goal of filing such a scholars’ brief is to influence the 
decisionmaker, and thus Fallon’s suggestion comes at a high price 
for those who write or sign such briefs with the hope of having such 
an effect. 
An even harder case is presented by the professor who believes 
                                                                                                 
from the authority of [the] system – and yet [to refuse to] act according to its 
terms”). 
42 Fallon, supra note 1, at 259. 
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that the death penalty is unconstitutional, and who also concludes 
that it is difficult to distinguish a particular death row inmate’s case 
from the precedent permitting execution. In other words, the prec-
edent provides stronger support for execution than clemency. If I 
understand correctly, Fallon would conclude that a law professor 
who signs a scholars’ brief arguing that the precedent can be 
stretched to require sparing the life of the prisoner has violated the 
ethical norms of his profession.43  
I disagree, because precedents are often unstable and transitory, 
and can be read to support a variety of results. If any reasonable ar-
gument can be made, even if it is not the best fit with the current 
precedent, judges can benefit from hearing that argument. Perhaps 
judges will be persuaded to carve out more exceptions to the death 
penalty, or to create greater procedural hurdles to its implementa-
tion, than the existing case law would seem to permit.44  
Indeed, this situation is not-so-hypothetical. The Supreme Court 
has recently declared the death penalty unconstitutional for juve-
niles45 and the mentally incapacitated,46 despite precedent at odds 
with those conclusions. I do not think that law professors who 
joined in amicus briefs supporting those results violated their moral 
or professional obligations. In fact, these cases may be incremental 
steps that lead to the Court’s eventual declaration that the death 
penalty is unconstitutional in all applications, and thus I can see no 
reason for law professors who hold that view to abstain from partic-
ipating in what may be important stepping stones toward that result. 
                                                                                                 
43 See id. at 229 (The “best or correct resolution of a legal issue depends partly on 
how the result would cohere or fail to cohere with a sometimes intricate network 
of existing authorities.”). 
44 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 29, at 157 (“[A]n appellate court is free, without 
hesitation and apology, to make any shift in content and direction of authorities 
which can be worked by the semi-automatic process by which authorities just take 
on new light, color, shape – and wording – as they are reviewed against fresh 
circumstance; but that conscious reshaping must so move as to hold the degree of 
movement down to the degree to which need truly presses.”). 
45 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
46 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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2. Confrontation 
The confrontation norm suffers from some of the same flaws as 
the trustworthiness norm. In any close case, there will be reasonable 
arguments on both sides of the question. Indeed, in some cases the 
legal authorities might provide stronger support for the opposing 
party. A scholars’ brief should lay out all reasonable arguments for 
why those precedents should be overturned or distinguished, but 
professors should be under no special moral obligation to spell out 
the weaknesses in their own argument. The point of such a brief is 
to give a court the benefit of these experts’ reasonable arguments in 
favor of a result that they sincerely support, not to lay out all points 
on either side of the question for the judge to consider. To require 
otherwise suggests that there is only one “correct” answer to any 
question, rather than several reasonable views of the law, any one of 
which could be adopted by a judge acting within the parameters of 
her role.47 
Furthermore, to require a scholars’ brief to include all or most 
of the counter-arguments to its position would distract from its 
primary message, and is in any case unnecessary. The adversarial 
process negates the need for confrontation in an amicus brief that is 
called for in a scholarly article. A scholarly article is expected to 
stand on its own. That is, a reader should be able to reach a conclu-
sion about the author’s hypothesis without needing to read other 
sources. The same does not hold true for an appellate brief. The 
judge should not reach a decision based on reading a single amicus 
brief, or even all the briefs supporting just one party. Rather, the 
judge’s decision should be informed by the adversarial exchange 
between the parties and their amici.48 Ideally, then, all reasonable 
counterarguments to a scholars’ brief will be raised by the opposi-
                                                                                                 
47 Of course, good advocacy might require an amicus brief to anticipate and refute 
possible objections. My point here is not that the scholars’ brief should never 
include counter-arguments, but rather that the author and signatories have no 
moral obligation to do so. 
48 See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN 
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 2 (1988). 
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tion, and thus it is simply unnecessary for the scholars’ brief to make 
those arguments for their adversary. But even if the opposing parties 
fail to raise objections, the fact that a scholars’ brief is submitted in 
an adversarial context itself eliminates any moral obligation to do 
opposing parties’ job for them. 
3. Personal Responsibility 
Nor do I believe that a professor must take the same level of per-
sonal responsibility for the content of a scholars’ brief as she would 
for scholarly work published under her name. Of course, a profes-
sor should read the brief carefully, should only sign it if it is in an 
area of the law in which she is an expert, and should have good rea-
son to trust the author to have done her homework. But I do not 
think that a professor must read or re-read all the authorities cited, 
or parse the brief to ensure that every proposition is fully and fairly 
supported by the authority cited for it. In other words, although a 
professor should be an expert in the general area of law addressed in 
the brief, a professor need not do more individual research than 
would a practicing lawyer before signing onto an amicus brief.  
An amicus brief is a different animal from a scholarly article, and 
is understood as such, and thus the individual responsibility norm 
should not apply. As a signatory to a scholars’ brief, I tell the world 
that I agree with it and that I hold myself out as someone with ex-
pertise in the area, but not that I personally wrote or researched it. 
By contrast, a scholarly article that bears my name is one in which I 
have declared myself to be both writer and researcher. Of course, 
this reasoning is somewhat circular. If Fallon’s view takes hold in 
the academy, then the understanding will be that the signatories to 
scholars’ briefs engaged in research similar to that done as scholar-
ship. But for the time being a signature on a scholars’ brief does not 
attest to the same level of personal involvement as does authorship 
of a scholarly article. 
Finally, requiring more input from signatories would be difficult 
as a practical matter. A single brief should have no more than two or 
three primary authors. Any more than that becomes unwieldy, and 
likely diminishes the quality of the final product. Nor is it realistic to 
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require circulation of a brief with sufficient lead time to allow a 
large group of people to make extensive edits. If even one member 
of the group of potential signatories makes any substantive edits, 
then the brief will need to be re-circulated to the entire group – a 
situation that could go on endlessly if every member of the group 
insisted on such changes. Thus, if law professors followed the norm 
of individual responsibility for every brief they signed, they would 
sign far fewer briefs. I think this would be a loss, for reasons dis-
cussed in Part II. 
CONCLUSION 
he ethical questions raised by scholars’ briefs are overdue for 
discussion. I agree with Fallon that authors and signatories of 
scholars’ briefs should meet different standards than practicing law-
yers writing amicus briefs, such as being experts in the subject area 
and sincerely believing in the result the brief advocates. Although I 
disagree with Fallon’s conclusion that scholars’ briefs must satisfy 
standards similar to those that apply to scholarship, I am glad that he 
started the conversation. Because I see some value in scholars’ 
briefs, I hope that conversation leads to more thoughtful participa-
tion in such briefs, rather than a significant reduction in an activity 
that keeps professors engaged with the practice of law. 
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